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Abstract
Privacy on the Internet has always been a concern, but monitoring of content by both private
corporations and Government departments has pushed people to search for ways to communicate over
the Internet in a more secure manner. This has given rise to the creations of Darknets, which are
networks that operate “inside” the Internet, and allow anonymous participation via a de‐centralised,
encrypted, peer‐to‐peer network topology.
This research investigates some sources of known Internet content monitoring, and how they provided
the template for the creation of a system to avoid such surveillance. It then highlights how
communications on the Clearnet is fundamentally different to that of a Darknet, and examines the
characteristics that determine whether or not a network could be classified as a Darknet. Selection of
said characteristics is based on how the network was developed, what its intended goals were, and how
it implemented technical measures to meet said goals. Five characteristics were found that could be used
to determine if a network is to be be classified as a Darknet.
Keywords
Darknet, encryption, anonymity, classification.
INTRODUCTION
Connectivity to the Internet has increased almost exponentially since its introduction to the mainstream
(International Telecommunication Union, 2013). In December 2012, there were approximately
12,161,000 Australian Internet subscribers (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013b) out of a total
population of approximately 22,880,000 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013a). Globally, around 2.7
billion people were online in early 2013 – around 39% of the world’s population (International
Telecommunication Union, 2013). Such usage is accompanied by a significant flow of data.
In 2011, approximately 30.73 Exabytes (approximately 3.30*1010 Gigabytes) of data was transmitted
across the Internet, and it is estimated that this quantity of data will grow to 110.28 Exabytes by 2016 –
a growth of approximately 358% in just 5 years (Cisco, 2012). The capability and capacity that such
interconnectivity affords is altering not only the way in which the technology is used, but also users
physical lives with internet based activities firmly entrenched in daily routines (Sandvine, 2013).
Given the popularity of Internet communications, it was perhaps always likely that both private and
public entities would take an interest in what information is being exchanged. It could also be said that
those that place a high value to their security and anonymity would seek ways to ensure their
communications could not be monitored. To this end networks referred to as “Darknets” were created
to ensure that data exchanged could not be intercepted, altered or read by an outside party.
Investigating what characteristics constitute a Darknet will help formalise what is currently a fairly fluid
definition. A formal definition will aid in its correct use in both academic and other literature.
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MONITORING INTERNET CONTENT
It is typical for Governments to enact laws that require the national mail carrier and ISPs (Internet
Service Providers) to have provisions for content control. Such provisions exist in Australia for mail to be
checked for contents that may be prohibited, and in the same way, ISPs must stop access to content
that is deemed to be unacceptable (Commonwealth Consolidated Acts, 1997). However, filtering
content under the Act has caused collateral damage, and could be seen as a way to implement a wider
Internet content filter (LeMay, 2013). Some countries appear to have already taken this monitoring a
step further ‐ in Russia, Skype calls are able to be monitored and the geographic location of the
participants able to be divulged (Sergina, Nikolsky, & Silonov, 2013).
People are able to use services such as email and VoIP, as well as social networks such as Facebook,
Twitter and LinkedIn to easily communicate with friends, family and members of the public across the
world. With near instant delivery of electronic communications, disseminating information that is of
interest to the intended audience is both simple and effective. Although many messages may be of low
significance to people outside of certain circles, often the ability to get accurate information out about
local events is of a global significance. It was the ability of citizens of Arab nations to be able to
communicate via electronic means the details of revolutionary uprisings in 2010, known as Arab Spring,
that led to an accelerated timeframe of political upheaval (Stepanova, 2011).
With the Internet playing such a significant role in the lives of their citizenry, many governments are
searching for ways to control, monitor and restrict the usage of such services under the banner of
protecting their citizens (Warf, 2010). Such control is seen as an anathema to the widely espoused
freedom that such technologies have afforded previously (Cardozo, Cohn, Higgins, Hofmann, & Reitman,
2013). The secret PRISM (Russell, 2013) and XKeyscore (Greenwald, 2013) programs ran by the NSA
(National Security Agency) of the United States show that global Internet data is being analysed. Such
security concerns may not completely unfounded though; there is a significant record of the Internet
being used to facilitate crime and ideas that may be seen to threaten the security or safety of the
general populous (Chambliss, 2011). Such concerns, which coupled with the ideologies of more
restrictive regimes, have lead countries such as China to construct electronic perimeters around their
citizens that are able to monitor and filter which Internet services they are permitted to access (Chen,
2012). This ensures said citizens do not access material that may be seen as detrimental to the
Government.
Perhaps one of the reasons that Governments are seeking such control is due to the existence of
websites such as Wikileaks (Wikileaks, 2013) and The New Yorker’s Strongbox (The New Yorker, 2013)
that cater to corporate and Government whistle‐blowers, allowing them to divulge information that
they cannot afford to be traced back to them. Whilst seen by a section of the community as a means of
dissemination of information, Governments may view the leaking of confidential information as a threat
to national security and undermining the secrecy that Governments may take for granted. Actions that
previously may have been unthinkable, such as the Watergate scandal, almost pass without comment. It
is not uncommon for Governments to acquire information that would previously have been
unobtainable for them(Sherman, 2013) (Gallagher, 2013).
Companies that create media and other digital content are also eager to implement restrictions, to
prohibit their creations from being illegally transmitted over the Internet. To help facilitate this, the
DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright Act) was passed in 1996 (United States of America Government,
1996). This United States copyright bill was designed to prevent the circumvention of content protection
methods. It also provides a way for copyright holders to enforce the removal of content from Internet
sites that violates their intellectual property copyright, via DMCA takedown notices. The Government of
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some countries, including New Zealand (New Zealand Government, 2011) and France (Legifrance, 2009),
have legislated that should intellectual property copyright be infringed multiple times, then criminal
prosecution may occur. As this step requires that ISPs divulge personal information regarding leases of
IP addresses during certain timeframes, concealing one’s identity may become more of a concern.
Not being able to be have personally identifiable information be easily harvested is also a concern to
those that have no interest in divulging confidential information. Advanced Internet data collection and
correlation techniques are being used to relate a person’s actions across the Internet, often without
their knowledge or consent. This gives rise to data that is of value to both those interested in identify
theft crime, and companies that seek to sell data about data about people that access a service on the
Internet. Many people are not comfortable with this, which has given rise to web browser extensions
that attempt to block such activity, but do not affect other applications (Abine, 2013). This application
prevents website being able to identify an individual, and gain data about them and their browsing
habits.
With the background of such concerns, a number of people are actively searching and building methods
to retain their online freedom. The ability to communicate in a way that allowed for the free,
anonymous, and secure exchange of information, while not being at the mercy of any single
organisation, was the impetus for the creation of Darknets. These are encrypted networks that operate
“inside” the Internet, sending data via the same communications infrastructure that is used by the rest
of the Internet.
WHAT IS A DARKNET?
Although the term “Darknet” has no formal definition, it was popularised in the paper “The Darknet and
the Future of Content Distribution” (Biddle, England, Peinado, & Willman, 2002), which defined a
Darknet as “…a collection of networks and technologies used to share digital content.”. The usage of
“Darknet” has evolved over time to refer collectively to all encrypted communication networks that
allow anonymous participation, and do so using a de‐centralised, peer‐to‐peer network topology,
running inside the Internet. Some examples of popular Darknets are Tor (The Onion Router), I2P
(Invisible Internet Project) and Freenet. To differentiate between the regular Internet and Darknets, the
term “Clearnet” was coined, which refers to the normal, publically accessible Internet at large (Egger,
Schlumberger, Kruegel, & Vigna, 2013). Darknets function inside the Internet, and are dependent on it
to function, but their design philosophies and goals dictate that they operate under fundamentally
different principles than that of the Clearnet. This may be illustrated by outlining how the two networks
communicate.
Clearnet communications overview
When a Clearnet user at home opens an URL (e.g. google.com.au) in their Web browser, data is initially
sent to their router. This is forwarded to their ISP’s routing infrastructure, which in turn forwards to the
next router (Kozierok, 2005). This continues until the last hop, which is the server that hosts the
requested page, which then services the request – in this case, displaying the Google Australia
homepage. The path that the data takes from the home PC to the Web server can be seen by running
tools such as tracerout (InetDaemon, 2013e) on the originating computer. Although the exact route that
data takes may change over time, based on the routing policy of the network infrastructure, it is likely
that subsequent paths will not vary greatly. All data sent via this method is transmitted unencrypted,
allowing for data observation, interception or alteration, as can be seen in the figure below.

14

Figure 1 ‐ Data routing across the Clearnet

Darknet communication overview
When a user of the Tor Darknet accesses the same website, data is initially sent to the Tor routing
software running on their PC. This software generates encrypted tunnels to one or more Tor entry
relays, of which there were approximately 3,500 as of June, 2013. Data is routed from the Tor software
through a tunnel to the Tor entry relay, which itself has encrypted tunnels to other Tor relays. Data is
forwarded to a number of other Tor relays, before it arrives at a Tor exit node, which is an exit points
from Tor into the Clearnet. From here data will traverse Clearnet paths to the server, which then
services the request. The exact path that the data took inside Tor cannot be predicted – only the
Clearnet route that the data took into Tor and the route it took when it exited Tor can be seen. All data
sent via Tor is encrypted in such a way that the original data source and destination cannot be
determined, and the data cannot be viewed or changed, as seen in the figure below.

Figure 2 – Data routing across Tor

As well as anonymising their access to Clearnet services, Darknet users may also elect to access websites
and other applications that are only available to Darknet users, also known as “hidden services”. These
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hidden services are configured to not be available to Clearnet users, and instead to only listen for
connections made via a Darknet. Hidden services afford both the host and the client of the application
anonymity. Being able to communicate and exchange data anonymously and securely has many legal
applications for Darknet users. However, it also allows for illegal services and activities to take place that
may not be easily taken down, compared to if the same services were available on the Clearnet.
DARKNET CHARACTERISTICS
There appears to be a general misunderstanding and misuse of the label “Darknet”. Terms that have
been identified as being used interchangeably include Dark Internet, Dark Address Space, Deep Web,
Deepnet, Dark Web, Invisible Web, Undernet, and Hidden Web. However, these terms are not synonyms
for “Darknet”, and have their own, generally accepted definitions. It is therefore important to determine
which criteria constitute a Darknet, and compare it to the Clearnet.
Encryption
Encryption is often not employed on the Clearnet, and its use is mostly confined to situations that
require sending authentication credentials, such as logging into an online banking website. Handling
encrypted traffic adds extra processing load to the destination’s infrastructure, which would add to the
costs of offering the service. To ensure that data transmitted cannot be intercepted, changed, observed
or read by anyone other than the intended source and destinations, all data that traverses Darknets is
encrypted. Although using differing encryption algorithms and implementations, the types of encryption
used in Darknets has been proven to take a very long time to decrypt, even for a very well‐funded
Government organisation, and may be considered secure for the foreseeable future (Smart et al., 2012)
– although the United States NSA (National Security Agency) is working to change this (Bamford, 2012).
As Darknet participants form part of the routing infrastructure, the extra processing required to encrypt
the data stream is shared amongst all participants.
Anonymity
It is usual that, every time a website is accessed on the Clearnet, the source of each request made is
logged by the destination. This log contains the IP address of the visitor, which pages they visited, and
some characteristics about their operating environment, such as operating system, web browser, and
their respective versions. This IP address can be correlated to a household, business or Government
agency by their respective ISP. Accessing other services, such as instant messaging or email, may also be
logged by the destination. These logs make it possible for law enforcement agencies to piece together a
user’s Internet activity. In Darknets, a core aim is to preserve every user’s anonymity. Each data stream
is encrypted and routed in such a way that the source and destination of the request cannot, outside of
user or program error, be determined. To prevent other forms of personal information from being
leaked, it is common for Darknet application to deliberately mask or sanitise any identifiable information
that is sent, such as information commonly provided by web browsers (The Tor Project, 2013b). There
are also mechanisms available to applications that run on Darknets for users to maintain a consistent
identity, should they wish to do so, thereby enabling users to be pseudo‐anonymous. These aliases allow
for social networks to be established and utilised.
Routing
Clearnet data takes a path to its destination based on routing rules set up by a user’s ISP, their upstream
provider, and eventually the preference of the destination. This is facilitated by using technologies such
as BGP (Border Gateway Protocol), which governs which of the available telecommunications carriers is
used to send data to the next hop of its destination. There are a number of factors that determine which
route the data takes, but they are primarily based on latency, cost, geography or congestion of the
source and destination of the data. The core Internet routing infrastructure is comprised of dedicated,
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expensive hardware, and designed to handle a massive amount of traffic on a continuous basis, with
route that data takes can be seen by an end user by running tools such as traceroute (InetDaemon,
2013). For Darknet traffic however, the path that data takes is designed to be untraceable. The route
may be based on a number of factors including link stability, latency and bandwidth, but will change
frequently and randomly to ensure that analysis cannot determine either the source or destination of
the request, thereby assuring the anonymity of both the source and destination of the data (The Tor
Project, 2013a). Darknet participants, which usually also act as routers, are themselves unaware of
where the data originally came from, knowing only the source and destination of the preceding and
subsequent hops (Acquisti, Dingledine, & Syverson, n.d.).
Applications
Once a network connection has been established with an ISP, applications on the host computer can
exchange data directly with their intended endpoint via the host operating system’s network stack.
There are a vast array of applications that exchange data via the Clearnet, such as web browsers, email
clients, file sharing tools and games. In Darknets however, after an Internet connection is established,
separate software must be installed and ran to form an entry point into a Darknet. Once connection to
the Darknet is established, applicable applications must be told to route their data into the Darknet via
this conduit. Not all applications are able to communicate on Darknets, which has led to specialised
applications that are designed to solely communicate via Darknets, and are generally preconfigured to
route data via them.
Visibility
It is trivial for an ISP or other entity with access to the relevant Internet infrastructure to see what sort
of activity a Clearnet user is participating in. This information may be logged as part of a transparent
proxy, or other “default on” logging system. Should a user be identified for further analysis, then packet
capture software can be employed to get a more detailed view of the user’s online activities. Connecting
to an encrypted Clearnet services can hide the contents of the data transmitted, but the source and
destination are trivial to obtain. Although there may be indicators in network traffic that a user is
connected to a Darknet (Barker, Hannay, & Szewczyk, 2011), a user’s participation may easily be
overlooked, provided that there is no other cause to examine the participant, such as excessive
bandwidth usage, a higher‐than‐expected amount of encrypted traffic, or a high amount of traffic on
non‐standard ports.
The above criteria may be summarised as seen the table below.
Table 1 – Comparison of Clearnet and Darknet attributes

Encryption
Anonymity
Routing

Clearnet
Sometimes
Users traceable
Based on capacity, cost and geography

Applications
Visibility

Many
Obvious

Darknets
Always
Users anonymous
Based on anonymity, stability and
capacity
Few
Hidden
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CONCLUSION
The Internet is a heavily used resource, replacing many traditional methods of communication. It is
therefore perhaps not surprising that many public and private entities have a growing interest in
monitoring the content that is being transmitted across it. Given the privacy concerns voiced by people
not content to allow said monitoring, being able to avoid having their data be captured and analysed is
becoming a pressing issue for some.
Five Darknet characteristics were suggested as the basis for identifying whether or not a network could
be classified as a Darknet. When compared against Clearnet attributes, said characteristics show that,
although intertwined, the two networks operate under very different parameters. Although further
investigation is needed, it is suggested that, should a network meet the presented criteria, then it could
be a candidate for being classified as a Darknet.
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